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Abstract 
Research Summary 
Using U.S. Sentencing Commission data, this study assesses whether judicial downward 
departures are more prevalent among child pornography offenders compared with a matched 
sample of defendants convicted of other offenses. Additionally, we examine reasons given by 
judges when departing from the guidelines for these offenders. We found that child pornography 
defendants received significant reductions in sentences by way of judicial downward departures.  
Policy Implications 
In 2007, the Supreme Court considerably altered the federal sentencing process. In Kimbrough 
v. United States (2007), the Court held that judicial departures were permissible on grounds of a 
policy disagreement. Many circuit courts have authorized sentencing judges to depart from the 
guidelines in child pornography cases based on such a policy disagreement. The findings of this 
study suggest that judicial downward departures for these offenders cannot be explained by 
individual characteristics, such as race, gender, or age, and may be indicative of a specific 
disagreement with this particular sentencing policy. An examination of the reasons provided by 
judges supports the hypothesis that judges may be attempting to remedy what they perceive as 
unjustly harsh sentencing guidelines.  
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“Fundamentally Flawed”? Exploring the Use of Policy Disagreements in Judicial Downward 
Departures for Child Pornography Sentences 
 
In 1984, Congress enacted the Sentencing Reform Act, which created the U.S. 
Sentencing Commission (USSC) and authorized the Commission to develop and implement 
presumptive sentencing guidelines designed to achieve “honesty,” “uniformity,” and 
“proportionality” in sentencing. The Act also abolished discretionary release on parole, stated 
that departures from the guidelines would be permitted with written justification, and provided 
for appellate review of sentences to determine whether the guidelines were correctly applied or a 
departure was reasonable. 
Restructuring the federal sentencing process has not been without its challenges and 
limitations, and a recent U.S. Supreme Court decision significantly altered the process by 
requiring the guidelines to function in an advisory role (United States v. Booker, 2005). 
Concomitantly, Congress has imposed directives that, some contend, abandon the true objectives 
of the guidelines and may instead exploit public fear to inform sentencing policy (Basbaum, 
2010; Kimbrough v. United States, 2007). Critics also contend that congressionally enacted 
policies have led to controversial sentencing practices such as the crack- and powder-cocaine 
disparity (Kautt and Spohn, 2002). This led the Supreme Court to rule, in Kimbrough v. United 
States (2007), that sentencing judges are free to disregard these sentencing guidelines if they 
believe that their application results in sentences for crack cocaine offenses that are unreasonably 
severe. Three years later, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit applied the reasoning 
established in Kimbrough to the child pornography guidelines (United States v. Dorvee, 2010). 
The court noted that these guidelines require sentence enhancements for most offenders and thus 
result in “unwarranted similarities among sentences for defendants who have been found guilty 
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of dissimilar conduct” (p. 187). The court further stated that this inherent inconsistency with the 
principles underlying the sentencing guidelines meant that “a district court may vary from the 
Guidelines range based solely on a policy disagreement with the Guidelines, even where that 
disagreement applies to a wide class of offenders or offenses” (p. 188). This decision has been 
followed by many other circuit court opinions reiterating this position.
 1
  
The purpose of this article is to determine how often judges use their discretion to depart 
from sentencing guidelines for child pornography offenses and to identify the reasons for judicial 
downward departures in these cases. This article will be the one of the first to review departures 
in child pornography cases empirically (see also Hamilton, 2014), which are a newer group of 
offenses to have their guideline usefulness and appropriateness debated. Analyses will control 
for individual- and case-level characteristics potentially associated with downward departures to 
determine whether downward departures are more likely in child pornography cases than in 
cases involving sexual abuse and other types of offenses.   
 
Federal Sentencing of Child Pornography Offenders 
Before the advent of the Internet, finding and obtaining images of child pornography required 
either going into a back room of a seedy adult store or using a mail order business, which 
increased the risk of detection. The production of child sexual abuse images was difficult and 
expensive (U.S. Department of Justice, n.d). This all changed once these images went digital. 
The Internet provided an easy place for individuals to create, retrieve, and spread images of child 
                                                 
1
 United States v. Huffstatler (7th Cir., 2009); United States v. Dorvee (2nd Cir., 2010); United States v. Grober (3rd 
Cir., 2010); United States v. Pape (7th Cir., 2010); United States v. Henderson (9th Cir., 2011); United States v. 
Garthus (7th Cir., 2011); United States v. Halliday (7th Cir., 2012). 
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pornography worldwide with nearly complete anonymity. Ever since, law enforcement has been 
fighting an uphill battle to detect and eradicate this crime (Jenkins, 2001).  
Along with law enforcement efforts, legislative responses have become more severe as 
the prevalence of child pornography has increased. Over the past 30 years, Congress has 
increasingly focused on expanding the scope of child pornography laws and the severity of 
penalties (for an overview of the history of child pornography legislation, see U.S. Sentencing 
Commission, 2009). The two general types of child pornography offenses are (a) the production 
of child pornography and (b) nonproduction offenses such as the possession, distribution, and 
receipt of these images.
2
 Under the federal sentencing guidelines, the recommended sentence for 
child pornography offenders has, in some cases, increased sevenfold over the past two decades 
(Hamilton, 2011).  
Congress has played a significant role in creating and amending child pornography 
sentencing guidelines, substantively revising the guidelines nine times (U.S. Sentencing 
Commission, 2009). The base-level offense severity score for nonproduction child pornography 
offenses has increased from 13 for possession and 15 for the receipt, transportation, and 
distribution of images in 1992, to 18 and 22, respectively, in 2012 (U.S. Sentencing Commission, 
2012). Using the base-level guidelines, the minimum sentence for a defendant convicted of 
possession of child pornography who had a minimal or no criminal history would have been 18 
months in 1992, but it was 41 months in 2012. This represents an increase of more than 70% in 
the guideline minimum (U.S. Sentencing Commission, 2012).  
Beyond the increase in the base-level guidelines, Congress also has enacted sentence 
enhancements that apply to child pornography offenders (Basbaum, 2010; Hamilton, 2011; 
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 Nonproduction of child pornography offenses are defined under 18 U.S.C. § 2252 and 18 U.S.C.§ 2252A. 
Production of child pornography is defined under 18 U.S.C. § 2251 and § 2260. 
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Hessick, 2011; U.S. Sentencing Commission, 2009, 2012; United States v. Dorvee, 2010). The 
application of enhancements results from such things as the use of a computer, the number of 
images possessed, and sharing of images. Use of the Internet to distribute and share child 
pornography means that these enhancements, which were designed to be used as aggravating 
factors in determining sentences for offenders convicted of more severe forms of offending, 
might apply to a significant percentage of child pornography cases (Basbaum, 2010; Hamilton, 
2011; U.S. Sentencing Commission, 2012). Their application also results in very punitive 
sentences. As Hamilton (2011) pointed out, federal sentences imposed for nonproduction child 
pornography are more severe than those for manslaughter, drug importation, and sexual abuse 
offenses. As will be explored subsequently, whereas some commentators have argued that these 
sentencing increases are disproportionately high compared with the seriousness of the offense, 
others have suggested that the substantial harm associated with child pornography crimes 
demands harsh penalties for these offenders.  
 
Actual Risk or Moral Panic? 
Concern regarding the dangers posed by sex offenders has existed for decades (Jenkins, 1998). 
Scholars have suggested that many sex offender laws, including sex offender registration, 
community notification, and sentencing statutes, were the result of a “moral panic” about the 
dangers that these individuals pose to victims, especially children (Gavin, 2005; Hinds and Daly, 
2001; Jenkins, 1998; Quinn, Forsyth, and Mullen-Quinn, 2004; Sample, 2006, 2011; Sample and 
Kadleck, 2008; Steinbock, 1995; Zgoba, 2004). According to Sample (2006), this moral panic 
reflects public fear resulting from a few isolated incidents of sexually related child homicides. 
The outcome is a demand from the public for quick legislative action. Critics contend that 
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extensive media coverage of these events promoted exaggerated perceptions of an epidemical 
problem (Ben-Yehuda, 1990; Cohen, 2002; Sutherland, 1950).  
The scholarly discourse about the specific influence of moral panic on child pornography 
legislation in particular is limited. Some scholars have concluded that the amount of child 
pornography on the Internet is so pervasive as to warrant even greater public concern (Jenkins, 
2001). The extent of child pornography available online, however, is unknown and accurate 
assessments are difficult to obtain (Howitt and Sheldon, 2007). Nevertheless, as Jenkins (2001) 
contended, the possibility that even a small amount of child pornography is readily available 
online is a problem that warrants concern. Those who apply the term “moral panic” to child 
pornography legislation do not deny that the problem exists (Cohen, 2002; Jenkins, 2001); rather, 
they contend that its significance is exaggerated or distorted to the point that it leads to reaction-
based policies that are constructed out of fear and that might be ineffective. In actuality, the 
effectiveness of these policies is unknown. 
Child pornography legislation has increasingly focused on prosecuting and punishing 
those who possess or share images (U.S. Sentencing Commission, 2009). Law enforcement has 
engaged in sting operations and undercover strategies that troll online file-sharing websites to 
find individuals who collect or share images of child pornography (U.S. Sentencing 
Commission, 2012). Given the dramatic discrepancy between the number of convictions for 
possession of child pornography and convictions for production offenses, it seems that little 
investigative attention focuses on those who produce child pornography.
3
 One argument for this 
strategy is the classic economic perspective of supply and demand; that is, concentrating efforts 
on decreasing the demand for these images will in effect reduce the number of images being 
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 In 2010, 1,717 offenders were convicted of nonproduction offenses compared with 207 who were convicted of 
production offenses (U.S. Sentencing Commission, 2012: ii n. 5). 
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created (Jenkins, 2001). This rationalization, however, has not been tested or proved. No studies 
to date have assessed whether the continued effort to reduce demand has had any impact on the 
production of child pornography.    
Hessick (2011) identified and critiqued reasons given by those in favor of sentencing 
offenders convicted of nonproduction child pornography offenses as severely as, or even more 
severely than, offenders convicted of sexually abusing children. According to Hessick (2011: 
855), support for severe sentences for those who possess or distribute child pornography is “tied 
to a perception that those who possess child pornography are indistinguishable from those who 
actually abuse children.” As Hessick noted, this notion is expressed in various forms; however, 
those who make this argument assume that offenders who view child pornography images on a 
computer either have already abused a child in the past, currently want to abuse a child, or will 
abuse a child in the future. This assumption has been called into question by recent research (i.e., 
Basbaum, 2010; Bourke and Hernandez, 2009; Buschman, Wilcox, Krapohl, Oelrich, and 
Hackett, 2010; Seto and Eke, 2005). One meta-analysis, for example, compared online and 
offline sexual offenders and found that there were statistically significant differences between the 
two groups of offenders (Babchishin, Hanson, and Hermann, 2011). The authors found that 
online offenders had greater victim empathy but expressed greater sexual deviancy than 
offenders who did not access child pornography online. In addition, a meta-analysis of studies 
that reviewed the prevalence of physical sexual abuse of children by child pornography offenders 
found there might be a subgroup of online offenders who pose a relatively low risk of 
committing physical sexual abuse against children (Seto, Hanson, and Babchishin, 2011).  
According to Hessick (2011), another reason cited to justify the severity of sentences for 
nonproduction child pornography offenses is that the images are equivalent to, or possibly even 
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worse than, the actual sexual abuse of the child. The assumption is that victims of child sexual 
abuse are more harmed by the sharing and availability of the images depicting their abuse than 
by the actual abuse itself. Those who advocate severe punishment also argue that harsh sentences 
have a preventative effect—that is, to prevent those who view child pornography from physically 
abusing children in the future, the punishment for nonproduction child pornography offenses 
must be severe (Hessick, 2011). This argument relies on the belief that possession or viewing of 
child pornography will increase an individual’s risk for future physical victimization of a child. 
Research that has been conducted to test this hypothesis, however, has not found support for 
such a relationship (Seto et al., 2011).  
In summary, there is a lack of empirical evidence to support many of the claims for 
increased severity of punishment for nonproduction child pornography offenses. This finding is 
problematic, as the U.S. sentencing guidelines are supposed to be based on empirical evidence to 
establish reasonable and rational sentences (U.S. Sentencing Commission, n.d.). This lack of an 
empirical foundation for child pornography sentencing guidelines has been part of the basis of 
many circuit court opinions authorizing sentencing judges to disregard these guidelines 
altogether. 
 
Sentencing Guidelines and Judicial Policy Disagreements 
Critics of the indeterminate sentencing systems that were common prior to the advent of 
sentencing guidelines charged that judicial discretion produced unwarranted disparity in 
sentencing outcomes (Tonry, 1996). To combat this disparity, there was overwhelming support 
for reform of the sentencing system (Frankel, 1972). In 1984, under the Sentencing Reform Act, 
Congress established the USSC to create a sentencing system with the principal goal of 
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decreasing unwarranted disparity in the federal sentencing process by the strict structuring of 
judicial discretion (Nagel and Schulhofer, 1992). Congress ordered the Commission to develop 
guidelines that incorporate the purposes of punishment, provide certainty and fairness, and 
“reflect, to the extent practicable, the advancement in knowledge of human behavior as it relates 
to the criminal justice process” (28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(c)). Although a substantial body of 
research assessed the influence of sentencing policy on reducing unwarranted disparity among 
similarly situated defendants (for examples, see Albonetti, 1997; Griffin and Wooldredge, 2006; 
Koons-Witt, 2002; Kramer and Ulmer, 1996; Spohn, 2000; Stolzenberg and D’Alessio, 1994; 
Ulmer, Light, and Kramer, 2011a, 2011b; Wang, Mears, Spohn, and Dario, 2013; Wooldredge 
and Griffin, 2005; Zatz, 2000), most scholars have not considered the possibility of unwarranted 
similarity in the sentences imposed on defendants convicted of dissimilar conduct. 
As Congress has continued to restrict federal judicial discretion, the legal system has 
been pushing back through court rulings designed to restore some level of judicial autonomy 
(Ulmer et al., 2011a). For example, Congress sought to limit judicial discretion by enacting the 
PROTECT Act of 2003, which attempted to eliminate all unenumerated downward departures 
for all offenses and ultimately did so for child pornography and child sex abuse offenses (U.S. 
Sentencing Commission, 2009). Two years later, the Supreme Court ruled that the guidelines are 
“effectively advisory” (United States v. Booker, 2005: 245) and clarified that appellate judges 
could uphold sentences determined to be reasonable, regardless of whether the sentences fell 
inside or outside the guideline range (Rita v. United States, 2007). In Gall v. United States 
(2007), the Court further held that district judges must make individualized assessments based on 
the facts of the case presented and need not automatically assume that the guideline range is 
reasonable.  
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As a result of these court decisions, federal district judges have more latitude to depart 
from the sentencing guidelines based on individualized assessments of offenders and their 
crimes. Following Booker, judges were allowed to depart from the sentencing guidelines based 
on individual case circumstances. In Kimbrough v. United States (2007), the Supreme Court 
expanded this, holding that district judges could use departures not only for individualized 
reasons specific to an offender or a case but also based on the judge’s categorical disagreement 
with a specific sentencing guideline policy (Michelman and Rorty, 2012). This opinion 
specifically addressed policy disagreement with the disparate sentences required for offenders 
convicted of offenses involving crack and powder cocaine, but several appellate courts have 
applied this reasoning to child pornography offenses (U.S. Sentencing Commission, 2012). As a 
result, the use of downward departures in these types of cases has increased. For example, in 
2011, 44.9% of child pornography offenders received non–government-sponsored downward 
departures. By contrast, the national average for non–government-sponsored downward 
departures for all federal offenses for that same year was 17.4% (U.S. Sentencing Commission, 
2011).
4
 Although other appellate courts have concluded that policy disagreement arguments 
cannot be used to justify downward departures in child pornography cases, there is little doubt 
that offenders in these cases are regularly being sentenced below the guideline range. This 
phenomenon is confirmed by a recent study conducted by Hamilton (2014), which found that a 
child pornography offender was more likely to receive a downward departure if the sentencing 
judge listed a concern about the general adequacy of the guideline. These results offer a clear 
                                                 
4
 District court cases that have authorized this use of policy disagreement judicial departure include United States v. 
Huffstatler, 2009; United States v. Stone, 2009; United States v. Dorvee, 2010; United States v. Grober, 2010; 
United States v. Pape, 2010; United States v. Henderson, 2011; and United States v. Garthus, 2011. Courts that have 
rejected this application include United States v. Pugh, 2008; United States v. Miller, 2011; United States v. Mohr, 
2011; United States v. Bistline, 2012; United States v. Black, 2012; and United States v. Strieper, 2012. 
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indication that policy disagreements may play a significant role in the sentencing of child 
pornography offenders. This current study will build on and extend these results by Hamilton by 
providing a robust comparison of child pornography cases with another set of cases in which 
policy disagreements have not been raised. Additionally, by providing a qualitative review of 
departure reasons, we hope to demonstrate the role of policy disagreements in federal sentencing 
decisions. As we argue next, the focal concerns perspective may help to explain the prevalence 
of downward departures for child pornography offenders.  
 
Theoretical Perspective on Downward Departures in Child Pornography Cases 
According to the focal concerns perspective, judicial decision making is based on an assessment 
of the offender’s blameworthiness, a desire to protect the community from dangerous offenders, 
and concerns about the practical constraints on and consequences of sentencing decisions 
(Steffensmeier, Ulmer, and Kramer, 1998). Focal concerns theorists argue that judges have 
limited case information (Albonetti, 1991) and, therefore, develop a “perceptual shorthand” 
based on stereotypes linked to an array of offender characteristics, including race/ethnicity, 
gender, social class, and other social positions (Engen, Gainey, Crutchfield, and Weis, 2003: 
110; Kramer and Ulmer, 2002: 904; Steffensmeier and Demuth, 2000: 709; Steffensmeier et al., 
1998: 768; Ulmer and Johnson, 2004: 145). These offender characteristics (along with offense 
type and prior record) influence sentencing outcomes because images or attributions connect 
them to groups thought to be bad (or good) risks for rehabilitation, potentially dangerous (or 
not), and more (or less) culpable (Bridges and Steen, 1998; Hawkins, 1981; Steffensmeier and 
Demuth, 2000: 709). This assessment means that judges look beyond the current offense to 
consider offenders’ past behavior, personal background, and current circumstances; this allows 
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them to make distinctions among defendants who seem similar to one another based only on the 
convicted offense (Wheeler, Mann, and Sarat, 1988).  
As noted, one of the primary critiques of the current child pornography sentencing 
scheme is that it fails to distinguish between variations of severity, both within child 
pornography offenses as well as compared with other offenses (Basbaum, 2010; Hamilton, 2011; 
Hessick, 2011; U.S. Sentencing Commission, 2009, 2012). Given the lack of adaptability within 
the child pornography sentencing structure, it is possible that judges will be more likely to use 
downward departures to mitigate what they perceive as disproportionately severe sentences. In 
the tradition of the focal concerns perspective, judges could conclude that child pornography 
offenders do not pose a danger to the community to the extent that the guideline sentence would 
warrant. Additionally, downward departures may be used for offenders who are labeled as 
salvageable or sympathetic (Nagel and Schulhofer, 1992), For example, evidence shows that 
downward departures for providing substantial assistance in the prosecution and conviction of 
other offenders are used more frequently for female offenders (Albonetti, 2002; Mustard, 2001; 
Stacey and Spohn, 2006) and that the likelihood of receiving a substantial assistance departure is 
affected by the offender’s race/ethnicity, age, education, citizenship status, and other personal 
characteristics (Cano and Spohn, 2012; Hartley, Maddan, and Spohn, 2007; Johnson, Ulmer, and 
Kramer, 2008; Mustard, 2001; Spohn and Fornango, 2009; Steffensmeier and Demuth, 2000). As 
Spohn and Fornago (2009: 836–837) noted, although it is possible that women, younger 
offenders, and offenders with some college are more likely than men, older offenders, and those 
without a high-school degree to have information to trade and to be willing to trade the 
information they had for a lighter sentence, a more plausible explanation “is that prosecutors 
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used the motion for substantial assistance to mitigate the sentences of sympathetic offenders, 
regardless of whether these offenders had information they were willing to trade.” 
Studies have demonstrated that the characteristics of child pornography offenders are 
substantially different than those of most other types of offenders (U.S. Sentencing Commission, 
2012). For example, whereas the typical child pornography offender is an older White male 
(Wolak, Finkelhor, and Mitchell, 2011; Webb, Craissati, and Keen, 2007), most drug offenders 
are young minority males (Kautt and Spohn, 2002; Spohn, 2000). Additionally, most child 
pornography offenders are employed full time (Wolak et al., 2011). Given the unique nature of 
these types of offenders, it could be argued that child pornography offenders receive preferential 
judicial treatment based on their age, race/ethnicity, and other personal characteristics. This 
study will assess this possibility by controlling for known offender and case characteristics 
traditionally used in federal sentencing research to determine whether child pornography 
offenders are more likely to receive judicial downward departures compared with similarly 
situated offenders convicted of other offenses.   
 
Current Focus 
The purpose of this article is to determine whether sentencing judges use downward departures 
more frequently in child pornography cases than in cases involving offenders convicted of sexual 
abuse and other offenses. We also attempt to determine whether the magnitude of the sentence 
discount is larger in child pornography cases than in these other types of cases. Furthermore, we 
review the reasons given by sentencing judges for the use of downward departures in child 
pornography cases in an attempt to provide an initial assessment of whether the use of departures 
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in these case represents a categorical “policy disagreement” with the sentencing guidelines for 
this group of offenses.  
 
Data and Methods 
Data 
Data for this study were obtained from the USSC’s Standardized Research Files, which are 
publicly available and are the same data used by the USSC for its reports. For the purpose of this 
study, data from fiscal years 2010 and 2011 (October 1, 2009 to September 30, 2011) were 
combined to provide a sufficiently large number of cases for analysis.
5
 The years chosen for this 
study correspond with recent circuit court rulings that authorized the use of policy disagreement 
arguments in child pornography sentencing in 2010. The unit of analysis is each sentenced 
offender. For the first set of analyses, the data were limited to cases categorized as sexual abuse 
or child pornography.
6
 Doing so allows us to compare offenders convicted of two types of sex-
based offenses.
7
 We compare outcomes for offenders convicted of sexual abuse with those for 
offenders convicted of child pornography because both federal judges and legal scholars have 
specifically cited (and criticized) the harshness in federal sentencing for child pornography 
offenders compared with the more lenient penalties imposed on those convicted of the arguably 
                                                 
5
 These two data sets were compared to determine whether they could be combined for analysis; we found no 
statistical differences between the 2 years on the relevant variables of interest.  
6
 Sexual abuse offenses will be used as a comparison group in a subset of analyses.  
7
 It is necessary to note that sexual abuse offenses are generally not considered federal crimes and those that are 
prosecuted federally typically come from Native American reservations, which fall under federal jurisdiction for 
prosecution of serious offenses, or cases that were otherwise perpetrated on federal land. Most sexual abuse cases 
are prosecuted at the state level. The sexual abuse category includes both adult and child sexual abuse to provide a 
sufficient number of cases for analysis. Cases of obscenity were not included in this category. Analyses conducted 
using a Tobit model of the dependent variable using a comparison of “sexual abuse of a minor” cases with 
“nonproduction child pornography” cases did not produce results significantly different from those presented in this 
article. Specifically, this model produced an effect size of 2.45 (standard error = 0.47) in the final Tobit model.  
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more severe offense of sexual abuse (i.e., Hamilton, 2011; Hessick, 2011; U.S. Sentencing 
Commission, 2009; United States v. Dorvee, 2010). 
 The USSC data categorize all child pornography offenses into one offense group, which 
includes both (a) offenses related to possession, receipt, transportation, and distribution of child 
pornography images (hereinafter nonproduction offenses), as well as (b) cases involving the 
actual use of children in the production of child pornography in a single category. Production of 
child pornography, however, is considered a more serious offense than nonproduction offenses, 
and offenders convicted of these offenses receive significantly more severe sentences and are 
less likely to receive departures.
8
 These differences, coupled with the fact that circuit courts have 
allowed downward departures based on policy disagreement only for cases involving 
nonproduction of child pornography images, prompted our decision to exclude production cases 
from subsequent analyses. All offenders who were sentenced for offenses such as the receipt, 
transportation, and distribution of child pornography were grouped into one category. These 
offenders were sentenced under Title 18, sections 2252 or 2252A, of the U.S Code for Crimes 
and Criminal Procedure, which applies to offenses involving child pornography images in which 
offenders had no actual physical contact with minors. The cases that were excluded involved 
offenders who were sentenced under Title 18, sections 2251 or 2260, of the U.S. Code for 
Crimes and Criminal Procedure, in which actual physical abuse of minors was involved in 
making or attempting to make child pornography images.
9
  
                                                 
8
 Data analyses of the fiscal 2010–2011 data sets indicate that the mean sentence for offenders convicted of 
producing child pornography was 244.44 months, compared with 93.80 months for those convicted of 
nonproduction offenses. Moreover, 46.35% of offenders convicted of nonproduction offenses, but only 21.20% of 
those convicted of production offenses, received a judicial downward departure.  
9
 For cases that had multiple offenses, the most severe offense was used as is consistent with USSC methods.  
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The descriptive statistics for the independent and dependent variables are presented in 
Table 1. This table shows individual, case, and guideline variables for sexual abuse and 
nonproduction child pornography offenders.  
(Insert table 1 about here) 
 
Dependent and Independent Variables and the Analytic Approach 
The outcome of interest for this study is whether an offender received a judicial downward 
departure and as a result was sentenced below the guideline range. Following the approach 
advocated by Johnson and Kurlychek (2012; see also Bushway and Piehl, 2007), our dependent 
variable encompasses both the likelihood of a judicial downward departure and the magnitude of 
the sentence discount for receiving this type of departure, which is measured by the number of 
months between the guideline minimum sentence for that offense and an offender’s actual 
sentence received.
10
 We analyze this variable using Tobit regression (Tobin, 1958), which 
Johnson and Kurlychek (2012) argued more accurately models the departure decision as it 
accounts for the dependency between the outcomes measured by using a latent variable that 
incorporates both the likelihood of a departure and its magnitude. This approach is similar to the 
method used in research on incarceration decisions under sentencing guideline systems 
(Bushway and Piehl, 2007; Kurlychek and Johnson, 2010).  
The analyses for this study proceed in three stages. We first model our dependent 
variable using Tobit regression analysis and the full population of nonproduction child 
                                                 
10
 To create this variable, the likelihood of receiving a downward departure was coded as a dichotomous variable (1 
= received departure, 0 = did not receive departure). The magnitude of the departure was then calculated by 
subtracting the defendants’ final sentence from the proposed guideline sentence (capped at 470 months). These two 
variables were combined to create a latent variable that includes both offenders who did not receive a downward 
departure (coded as 0) and the sentence discount (in months) for all offenders who received a judicial downward 
departure.  
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pornography offenders and offenders convicted of all sexual abuse offenses. The primary 
independent variable is therefore a dichotomous variable that is coded 1 if the offender were 
convicted of a nonproduction child pornography offense and is coded 0 if the offender were 
convicted of sexual abuse. The independent variables used as controls in this model include the 
offender’s age and a dichotomous variable for the offender’s gender (male = 1, female = 0). 
Additionally, offender race/ethnicity was measured using three dichotomous variables (Black, 
Hispanic, and American Indian/Alaskan Native), with White as the reference group.
11
 The 
offender’s education was captured using two dichotomous variables (no high-school diploma and 
any college), with offenders who received a high-school diploma but had not been to college as 
the reference group. We also include the offender’s criminal history score (which ranges from 1 
to 6), offense severity score (which ranges from 1 to 43), and the number of counts of conviction. 
Other controls include whether an offender was detained (1 = yes, 0 = no), was a U.S. citizen (1 
= U.S. citizen, 0 = not U.S. citizen), went to trial (1 = yes, 0 = not), or had dependents (1 = yes, 0 
= no) and whether the case involved a mandatory minimum sentence (1 = yes, 0 = no). Finally, a 
dichotomous variable was created that represents whether the case was sentenced in a circuit that 
has rejected the application of Kimbrough-based policy disagreements regarding sentences for 
nonproduction child pornography offenses (1 = court rejects Kimbrough application, 0 = court 
has not specifically rejected this application).
12
 Descriptive statistics for these variables are 
                                                 
11
 American Indian and Alaskan Natives were included as they were significantly over-represented in sexual assault 
cases. This is expected given that many serious sexual assault offenses that occur on Native American reservations 
are transferred for federal prosecution.  
12
 Appellate decisions in circuits that have rejected the application of Kimbrough-based policy disagreements to 
child pornography offenses include the 4th, 5th, 6th, 8th, and 11th circuits—specific case citations are provided in 
footnotes 1 and 5. Circuits that have allowed policy disagreements for nonproduction child pornography offenses 
include the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 7th, and 9th circuits. The 10th circuit did not address this question during the time frame of 
this research study. Because they had not specifically rejected this application, they were included in the latter group 
of circuits for analysis.  
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available in Table 1. These variables are used for matching purposes in subsequent analyses, 
which are discussed next.  
Our second analytic approach uses propensity score matching to create a sample of child 
pornography and sexual abuse offenders matched on individual and case characteristics. As 
illustrated by the descriptive statistics presented in Table 1, child pornography offenders are 
predominantly older White males with at least a high-school diploma and little or no criminal 
history; by contrast, the typical sexual abuse offender is younger and is much more likely to be a 
racial minority, to have a higher criminal history score, and to have no high-school diploma. As 
such, it could be argued that differences in the use of judicial departures for these two types of 
offenders are the result of these differences in background characteristics and criminal history. 
Because random assignment of offense of conviction is not possible, we employ matching 
procedures to create a sample of child pornography offenders and comparable offenders 
convicted of sexual abuse offenses (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983; Smith, 1997; Winship and 
Morgan, 1999).
13
 By using propensity score matching, we can avoid any disparities that result 
from unaccounted-for selection effects (Loughran et al., 2009; Smith and Paternoster, 1990).
14
 
As another test, we use these matching strategies to compare nonproduction child pornography 
offenders with all other offenders, regardless of offense of conviction. 
In the current study, for the purposes of matching, the “treatment” in effect is whether a 
defendant is convicted of a child pornography offense. Depending on the analysis conducted, the 
                                                 
13
 Matching for all models is performed using the PSMATCH2 command in STATA 12 (StataCorp, College Station, 
TX). For the purposes of the analyses, both 1-to-1 matching without replacement and 1-to-1 matching with 
replacement were used. Other matching strategies were reviewed, including n-to-1 matching with replacement, none 
of which significantly affected the results of the analyses. As 1-to-1 matching is considered the most robust 
matching approach, this is the method presented to demonstrate the strength of the relationship. Matching 
commanders were assessed using several calipers, including 0.01, 0.02, and 0.05. The caliper of 0.05 was ultimately 
chosen because it allowed for the matching of the highest number of offenders.  
14
 For an explanation of propensity score matching used for analysis of sentencing departures, see Johnson and 
Kurlychek (2012). 
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comparison group is either the population of sexual abuse offenders or all non–child 
pornography offenders. The first set of matching analyses compares child pornography offenders 
with sexual abuse offenders, as this represents a comparison that is commonly discussed in the 
literature on child pornography sentencing. We also conduct analyses using child pornography 
offenders who are matched to all other federally convicted felony offenders, regardless of 
offense type. We use Tobit regression and the matched samples to test the robustness of the 
findings from the initial model.  
The final stage of the analysis focuses on the reasons given by judges for their application 
of downward departures for individual offenders. Although many challenges are inherent in 
attempting to conduct meaningful statistical analysis on judicial reasoning for sentencing below 
the guidelines, we suggest that this first attempt to review the reasons given for departures in 
child pornography cases can provide additional insight into judicial decision making in these 
types of cases. Within the federal sentencing data, judicial reasoning is coded somewhat 
arbitrarily, resulting in hundreds of possible reason codes that are not easily consolidated. The 
descriptions of these codes also are somewhat vague and require considerable interpretation.
15
 
Within this immensity of information, however, there are opportunities to make some speculative 
conclusions. For example, the number of times that a particular reason code has been employed 
can tell us the frequency in which these reasons are given for particular offenses.  
Along with this reason variable, those coded as “other” are accompanied with 
explanatory text, which offers potentially more insight. It may be that these “other” reasons for 
downward departures are those that go beyond what is included in the sentencing guideline 
                                                 
15
 A full list of reason codes available in the federal sentencing data set is available from the U.S. Sentencing 
Commission website at 
http://www.ussc.gov/Research_and_Statistics/Datafiles/Variable_Codebook_for_Individual_Offenders.pdf, last 
accessed on July 24, 2013. 
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options for departures or are cases in which the judge felt obligated to provide a more nuanced 
account of their departure decision. We calculate the rate at which judges use this “other” option 
by offense category, and we examine the textual accounts of these “other” reasons for departing. 
This allows us to determine the rate at which judges go outside the traditionally accepted reasons 
for giving a below-guideline sentence.  
 
Findings 
Table 2 provides results from the Tobit regression analysis examining the effects of being 
convicted of a nonproduction child pornography offense compared with sexual abuse offenses on 
departure likelihood and magnitude using the full population of offenders convicted of these 
offense types. The results of this analysis reveal that the use of judicial downward departures 
increases by a factor of 11.70 for offenders convicted of nonproduction child pornography 
compared with those convicted of sexual abuse offenses. These results document that legally 
irrelevant offender characteristics, including race/ethnicity, gender, age, and education, are not 
statistically significant in determining the likelihood of a judicial downward departure. In fact, 
the only statistically significant predictors of this outcome are legally relevant variables, such as 
the offender’s criminal history score, offense severity score, presumptive sentence, whether the 
offender was subject to a mandatory minimum sentence, and whether the offender was detained 
prior to conviction. Additionally, whether the case was in a circuit that rejected policy 
disagreements for child pornography offenders was statistically significant. However, the best 
predictor of receiving a judicial downward departure is whether the offender was convicted of a 
nonproduction child pornography crime rather than a sexual abuse offense.  
Insert table 2 about here 
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To show the robustness of these findings, we use propensity score matching to create a 
sample of nonproduction child pornography offenders and a matched sample of sexual assault 
offenders. Table 3 shows the results of the matching procedure and demonstrates that the 
prematch samples have significant differences between sexual abuse and child pornography 
offenders. Prior to matching, significant differences (p < .001) were found between the 
nonproduction child pornography and sexual abuse cases. The only variables on which these 
offenders did not differ was the average number of counts of conviction (p = .841) and whether 
the case occurred in a circuit that rejected policy disagreement application to child pornography 
offenders (p = .998). After propensity score matching was implemented, the 1-to-1 matching 
balanced the independent variables effectively and produced a matched sample of cases for 
subsequent analyses.
16
 This final matched sample produced two groups (nonproduction child 
pornography and sexual abuse offenders) that are comparable on all other independent variables 
in the model.  
Insert table 3 about here 
To demonstrate that the previous results are not an artifact of the type of matching 
procedure used and that the effects of nonproduction child pornography offender status on 
judicial downward departures are robust, several matching methods were employed. The effect 
sizes of nonproduction child pornography offense conviction are provided based on four 
different propensity models, using two different comparison groups. First, the nonproduction 
child pornography group was matched to sexual abuse cases using 1-to-1 matching, which is the 
strictest form of matching. Second, 1-to-1 matching with replacement was used with the same 
group of cases. This approach increased the number of matched cases so that a larger proportion 
                                                 
16
 Using this rigorous matching method limited the sample size to 672 matched cases, resulting in 336 matched cases 
in nonproduction child pornography and sexual assault cases each.  
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of child pornography offenders were matched. These two matching methods (1-to-1 
nonreplacement and 1-to-1with replacement) were then used to match nonproduction child 
pornography offenders to offenders convicted of any other type of offense.
17
 The results from the 
analyses using propensity score matching help to support the robustness of the findings in Table 
2.  
The results from the Tobit regression analyses performed using the four matched samples 
are presented in Table 4. The results from the four models are consistent regardless of the 
matching procedure or comparison group used. The range of estimates indicates that the 
likelihood of receiving a judicial downward departure increased between factors of 3.85 and 
35.79 for those convicted of nonproduction child pornography offenses. Recall from Table 2 that 
using the unmatched population of child pornography offenders resulted in an increase in use of 
judicial downward departures by 11.70 when compared with sexual abuse offenses. When using 
1-to-1 matching for the same group of offenders, this finding remains relatively consistent with 
an increase in the use of judicial downward departures for nonproduction child pornography 
offenders by a factor of 19.27. These effects for those convicted of nonproduction child 
pornography offenses remain statistically significant across all models and produce relatively 
high estimates. 
Insert table 4 about here 
Following the approach applied by Johnson and Kurlychek (2012) and Kurlychek and 
Johnson (2010), the Tobit coefficients were decomposed to examine separately the effect of 
being convicted of nonproduction child pornography on the probability of receiving a judicial 
downward departure and on the magnitude of the departure received. Using the 1-to-1 model 
                                                 
17
 Nearest-neighbor and additional methods of matching were tested beyond those listed in the article. The results 
from the analyses remained consistent regardless of the matching techniques that were applied.  
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without replacement and following the formulas in Osgood, Finken, and McMorris (2002), the 
results of the decomposition along with 95% confidence intervals are presented in Table 5. This 
table includes the decomposition for both the full-population Tobit regression model in Table 2 
as well as the matched Tobit model presented in Table 4. The results of this model show that 
conviction for nonproduction child pornography significantly affects both the likelihood and the 
magnitude of judicial downward departure decisions. Nonproduction child pornography 
offenders are approximately 32% more likely than offenders convicted of sexual abuse to receive 
a judicial downward departure, and when they do, their sentence discounts are almost 83% larger 
in the full-population model. These findings also are reflected in the decomposition of the 
sample of matched offenders with an approximately 25% increase in the probability of receiving 
a judicial downward departure and of receiving a sentence discount that is more than 83% 
longer.  
Insert table 5 about here 
Reasons for Downward Departures 
Although the quantitative analyses lend support for the hypothesis that judges are more likely to 
use downward departures for nonproduction child pornography offenders than for other types of 
offenders (including those convicted of sexual abuse), a closer examination of the reasons 
provided by judges for departure sentences in these cases could provide additional insights. 
When departing from the U.S. sentencing guidelines, federal judges are asked to provide reasons 
for giving a sentence that deviates from the recommended sentence. In the federal sentencing 
data provided by the USSC, these reasons are coded and identified for upward, substantial 
assistance, and below guideline departures. Unfortunately, grouping these reasons into 
meaningful categories is difficult and gleaning insight into judicial decision-making processes 
based on this limited information might not provide an accurate portrayal of whether these 
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decisions are based on individual offender circumstances or on judicial disagreement with the 
federal sentencing guidelines for child pornography offenses. Although they are not suitable for a 
quantitative analysis, delving deeper into these reasons for judicial departures in a qualitative 
fashion might prove useful in discerning whether judges are deliberately imposing sentences 
below the guideline range based on a fundamental disagreement with the policies of the USSC.  
The most common reasons given by U.S. sentencing judges for the use of downward 
departures are all based on 18 U.S.C. § 3553, which articulates various factors to be considered 
during the imposition of a sentence. The top three reasons given by judges for the use of 
downward departures in child pornography cases are the “Nature and circumstances of offense 
and history and character of defendant (18 3553(a)(1)),” “Reflect seriousness of offense, 
promote respect for law, provide just punishment for the offense (18 3553(a)(2)(A)),” and 
“Afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct (18 3553(a)(2)(B)).” Unfortunately, the 
nondescriptive nature of these reasons does not provide much insight into whether judges are 
using these to express categorical disagreement with the sentencing policy or whether these are 
individualized assessments or some combination of the two.  
Perhaps one area in which we can glimpse at the specific intentions of the sentencing 
judges is in the use of reasons that do not neatly fit into a specific category for coding purposes. 
A departure reason can be placed into hundreds of possible categories. Within the large number 
of possible reason codes available within the federal data, delving into those that do not fit into 
this coding structure could provide more insight. These textual explanations for guideline 
departures count as “other” within the coding system offer more meaning into the exact 
reasoning the judge provided.  
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 The first step in examining these textual departure reasons is calculating the frequency 
with which judicial reasons do not fit within the traditional departure reasons. To assess this, the 
number of textual reasons offered for each offense category was counted and the rate per 1,000 
cases was calculated. Table 6 provides the rate at which judicial explanations for downward 
departures were classified as “other” coding option. The rate at which judicial explanations fit 
within this “other” option for judicial downward departures is higher for nonproduction child 
pornography than for any other offense type. This finding suggests that judges might apply more 
nuanced explanations when using downward departures for child pornography offenses.  
 This result is further confirmed by the substance of the text descriptions provided for the 
reasons given for below guideline sentences for child pornography offenses. For example, judges 
noted that: 
 “2G2.2 [child pornography guideline] fundamentally flawed”  
 “Judge categorical disagreement with 2G2.2 enhancements including computer use and 
prepub [prepubescent] child and no [number] of images”  
 “BOL [baseline offense level] has increased without factual basis over time”  
 “Departs 2 levels double counting”  
 “Usage of computer enhances penalty court sees this as artificial”  
 “Ct [court] views actions of Congress regarding these types of cases as unreasonable”  
 “The constitutional problems involved in putting the conduct to this deft [defendant] in 
this particular statute”  
 “Courts are sentencing defts [defendants] below the gl [guideline] range in child porn 
cases in 40 percent of all cases”  
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 “Computer SOC [specific offense characteristics-, i.e., enhancements] is given despite 
being used in almost every case before the courts”  
Furthermore, the sentencing judges provided reference to several circuit court opinions that, as 
discussed, authorize them to depart from the guidelines based on disagreements with the 
sentencing policy. For example, some of the textual explanations for downward departures 
included reference to “Dorvee,” “US v. Dorvee,” “US v. Henderson 9th Cir,” and “US v. 
Gellatly,” all of which are court cases that allow for the use of policy disagreements for child 
pornography cases.  
 These types of textual reasons are not given to sexual abuse offenders. First, as noted in 
Table 6, textual reasoning for judicial downward departures for sexual abuse offenders occurs at 
a much lower rate than for nonproduction child pornography offenders. In the 2 years of 
sentencing data, textual explanations for judicial downward departures occurred in only 11 of 
792 sexual abuse offenders compared with 86 of the 3,359 nonproduction child pornography 
offenders (rates of 13.89 to 25.60 per 1,000, respectively). Additionally, the contents of these 
reasons tend to be specific to the individual offender rather than addressing the guideline policy. 
For example, reasons given for sexual abuse offenders include “defendant had a very difficult 
life,” “level of intoxication at time of offense,” “defendants life expectancy is substantially 
below the range,” “sexual activity was driven in part by alcohol,” “first involvement in sexual 
contact with a minor,” among others.  
Insert table 6 about here 
Conclusion 
In a 2011 policy essay, Rodney Engen posed a question to sentencing scholars that asked, “How 
are we to evaluate the exercise of judicial discretion, or changes in sentencing disparity, relative 
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to guidelines that many observers, including federal judges, believe are unjust?” (Engen, 2011: 
1145). Additionally, Engen encouraged scholars to evaluate sentencing policy by looking beyond 
issues of disparity toward the substantive meaning of “justice.” Some criminal laws do not 
reflect a rational and dispassionate assessment of the harm done by the crime, and their penalty 
structures, therefore, might not incorporate “normative expectations for appropriate punishment” 
(Engen, 2011: 1145; see also Frase, 2007). If this is the case, then federal district judges may use 
their discretion at sentencing—including their discretion to depart from the sentencing range 
called for by sentencing guidelines—to craft a sentence tailored to their perceptions of the 
seriousness of the crime. This study presents an opportunity to explore the use of judicial 
departures that potentially “enhance substantive justice by mitigating the impact of sentencing 
laws that many view as excessively harsh” (Engen, 2011: 1145). 
This research provides one of the first empirical examinations of federal judicial 
downward departures for offenders convicted of nonproduction child pornography, a crime that 
has received growing attention in the courts and legislature. Furthermore, this study offers a 
unique contribution to the body of literature on federal sentencing as it examines the possible 
consequences of unwarranted similarity in the sentences imposed on defendants convicted of 
dissimilar conduct. The current discourse surrounding the use of policy disagreement for judicial 
downward departures in the sentencing of child pornography offenders led to the hypothesis that 
judges would be more likely to depart from the guidelines for these offenders compared with 
others. In line with the findings from Hamilton (2014), the findings from this study support this 
hypothesis and demonstrate statistically significant differences in both the likelihood and 
magnitude of judicial downward departures for child pornography offenders, net of individual- 
and case-level characteristics. These findings, coupled with the reasons that judges give when 
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departing, suggest that judges believe that the guidelines for nonproduction child pornography 
offenses are overly harsh.  
The results of the current study have important implications for sentencing research, as 
they suggest that judges are using downward departures for reasons not always captured by the 
traditional individual- or case-level characteristics commonly assessed in sentencing research. In 
other words, judges are using these policies not to mitigate the harshness of the sentences 
mandated for certain types of sympathetic or salvageable offenders (Nagel and Shulhofer, 1992; 
Spohn and Fornango, 2009), but because of inherent disagreement with the severity of the 
sentences called for by the guidelines for the typical offender convicted of a nonproduction child 
pornography offense. By attempting to circumvent what they view as flawed and overly punitive 
sentencing policies, judges might be using their discretion to craft sentences that are more 
appropriate. The reasons provided by judges for downward departures in child pornography 
cases lend credence to this argument. Many judges who departed from the presumptive sentence 
did so because of disagreement with the sentencing policies (and the resulting presumptive 
sentences) adopted for these types of cases. 
Recent sentencing research has focused on the possible detrimental consequences of 
discretion and its potential for producing unwarranted disparity in sentences imposed on 
offenders based on race, ethnicity, sex, and age (Spohn, 2000; U.S. Sentencing Commission, 
2004; Zatz, 2000). Scholars also have assessed the impact of court cases such as Booker, Gall, 
and Kimbrough, with the assumption that any increase in disparity resulting from these cases 
would suggest a return to unfair sentencing practices where race/ethnicity, sex, and age are 
inappropriately considered in the sentencing process. Although this line of research is 
undoubtedly important, in that discovering any avenue for the biased consideration of these 
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factors is necessary to provide possible remedies, it seems to be based on a belief that judges or 
other court actors are either disinclined or incapable of using discretion in a logical and rational 
manner. The common assumption underlying this line of research is that the guidelines work to 
limit or minimize disparity (Engen, 2011). There has been, however, a push toward challenging 
this assumption in our approach to guideline-based research (Bushway and Piehl, 2007; Engen, 
2009; Kramer, 2009; Ulmer et al., 2011a, 2011b). An alternative approach, and one that has not 
been systematically tested (Kramer and Ulmer, 2002; Johnson and Kurlychek, 2012; Ortiz and 
Spohn, 2014), is that the use of discretion could be a possible remedy to counteract regulations 
that lead to inherent biases.  
The findings of this current study offer important implications for federal sentencing 
policy. Specific to child pornography sentencing, this analysis supports and provides an 
extension of the conclusions presented by the USSC’s study on child pornography sentencing 
(2012). The USSC report (2012) offered several recommendations for changes to this sentencing 
policy. First, the USSC report contended that the current sentencing scheme for child 
pornography offenders uses outdated measures of culpability and, therefore, imparts sentencing 
ranges that are too severe. The USSC recommends amending the guidelines to provide a more 
nuanced assessment of the severity of these offenses. Factors such as the nature of the offender’s 
collection behavior, the degree of engagement with other offenders, and history of sexually 
abusive, exploitive, or predatory conduct should be incorporated into the enhancement 
considerations (U.S. Sentencing Commission, 2012). The USSC recommendations also include 
the reevaluation of the use of enhancements for child pornography offenses. The enhancement 
imposed for use of a computer, for example, is outdated in the current context of child 
pornography offenses as most offenders use a computer in the commission this crime. 
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Sentencing enhancements are to represent aggravated offense characteristics, and therefore, the 
application of such enhancements to almost all offenders is inappropriate. These changes to the 
sentencing guidelines for nonproduction child pornography offenders could increase the 
perceived legitimacy of these policies in the eyes of sentencing judges, thus, reducing the 
number of downward departures.  
The issues related to the child pornography sentencing system represent a growing 
concern with sentencing policies in general, that of keeping up with technological advancements. 
This concern is perhaps most evident in the use of a computer enhancement for increasing the 
sentencing recommendation for child pornography offenders. Statutes written or adapted from 
two decades ago might not be relevant for judges sentencing defendants in the 21st century. This 
growing disconnect between sentencing policy and the technology used by offenders in the 
commission of crimes leaves judges with outdated standards for guidance in sentencing these 
types of offenses. Additionally, the USSC states that sentencing policies should “reflect the 
advancement in the knowledge of human behavior as it relates to the criminal justice system” 
(U.S. Sentencing Commission, n.d.). A substantial amount of empirical research on offenders has 
been conducted over the past several decades. Sentencing policies, however, do not seem to 
reflect many of the findings of this research, particularly with respect to child pornography 
offenses. As such, outdated policies could provide inappropriate guidance to sentencing judges.  
The use of policy disagreements in judicial downward departures underscores broader 
policy implications for the findings presented in this study beyond those related to child 
pornography. Particularly, the use of policy disagreement departures demonstrates a possible 
lack of institutional legitimacy of the USSC and emphasizes the need for accurate and 
empirically informed sentencing policies. The authorization of judges to disregard sentencing 
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guidelines based on a categorical policy disagreement suggests the potential for the reduced 
legitimacy of the guidelines system as a whole. Guidelines without reasons may result in the 
potential loss of legitimacy of the guideline system that can have far-reaching implications for 
sentencing. If judges cannot rely on the guidelines to provide just and informed guidance, then 
they might be less likely to refer to the guidelines when making sentencing decisions.  
In a recent article, Hessick (2014) offered three notable recommendations for changing 
the current U.S. sentencing guideline system and enhancing the legitimacy of the USSC. First, 
Hessick recommended that the USSC provide detailed explanations for its policy decisions. The 
U.S. sentencing guidelines undergo numerous revisions, and although these amendments are 
subject to a notice and comment process, the USSC does not currently provide detailed 
explanations for proposed changes. Second, Hessick suggested that the guidelines that have been 
the subject of repeated judicial disagreement be amended. This change could include 
amendments to controversial guidelines such as the crack–powder-cocaine disparity, child 
pornography offenses, career offender enhancements, among others. Finally, Hessick, after 
acknowledging the role of Congress in decisions regarding sentencing guidelines, suggested that 
the USSC consider encouraging legislative action that would increase the legitimacy of the 
Commission as an institution. For example, Hessick noted that most amendments to the 
guidelines have increased the severity of sentences. This “one-way ratchet,” according to 
Hessick, “undermines the image of the Commission as a neutral, expert body” (Hessick, 2014: 
1374). Additionally, it has been argued that the USSC disproportionately favors prosecutors and 
has no representation for defense counsel in its membership (Barkow, 2005; Hessick, 2014). 
Hessick argued that increasing representation of the defense community could increase the 
institutional legitimacy of the Commission’s actions by demonstrating a more neutral and 
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balanced agenda. The findings of this current study underscore the extent to which sentencing 
judges may go to circumvent guideline policies that are considered overly harsh and unjust. 
These types of policies might further demonstrate a lack of institutional legitimacy of the USSC. 
These recommendations could reestablish the central role of the U.S. sentencing guidelines in 
judicial decision making.  
The federal sentencing guidelines were developed in part to address the problem of 
unwarranted disparity in sentencing decisions and to reestablish the legitimacy of the criminal 
court system (Savelsberg, 1992). The sentencing guidelines are supposed to guide and advise 
judges as they attempt to tailor sentences that fit offenders as well as their crimes. The success of 
this process rests on judges’ faith in the legitimacy of the policies they are asked to implement; 
however, given the highly political process in which these guidelines are constructed, the ability 
to establish formal-rational policies is limited. As the courts’ authority to disregard the guidelines 
has increased in the wake of several Supreme Court decisions, the establishment of reasonable 
and legitimate sentencing policies becomes even more necessary to ensure continued progress 
toward fair and equitable sentencing practices. The future of sentencing policy should consider 
the possible consequences associated with the implementation of fundamentally flawed 
guidelines. The legitimacy of the guideline system might be diminished when the policies are 
deemed unreasonable. 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for Sex Abuse and Nonproduction Pornography Cases Before Propensity Score 
Matching 
Variable 
Sex Abuse  
(n = 792) 
Nonproduction 
Pornography  
(n = 3,359) 
Dependent Variable   
Judicial downward  16.86 46.35 
Mean sentence discount length (in months)
 
15.74 26.33 
Standard deviation 87.95 46.12 
Independent Variables 
  Case characteristics 
  Trial 12.72 3.36 
Detained presentence 82.40 57.41 
Offender characteristics 
  Mean age 37.07 42.24 
Standard deviation 12.90 13.32 
Range 17-79 19-88 
Percent male 95.33 99.17 
Percent college 35.85 55.09 
Percent high school only 37.52 34.87 
Percent no high-school diploma 26.63 10.04 
Percent White 33.84 88.68 
Percent Black 12.18 3.01 
Percent American Indian/Alaskan Native 40.31 0.54 
Percent Hispanic 9.39 6.31 
Percent other race 4.28 1.46 
Percent U.S. citizen 94.56 97.38 
Percent with dependents 49.87 30.89 
Guideline factors 
  Mean presumptive sentence (in months) 124.72 118.20 
Mean criminal history score 1.80 1.34 
Standard deviation 1.40 0.85 
Mean offense severity score 27.98 30.21 
Standard deviation 7.97 5.02 
Number of counts 1.41 1.39 
Standard deviation 1.17 1.38 
Range 1–14 1–28 
Mean circuit reject policy disagreement 48.61 54.27 
Mean mandatory minimum case 35.10 51.09 
JUDICIAL DOWNWARD DEPARTURES FOR CHILD PORNOGRAPHY 
46 
 
Table 2. Tobit Regression Model of (Ln) Judicial Downward Departures for Unmatched 
Nonproduction Child Pornography and Sexual Abuse Offenders 
Variable 
Downward Departure 
b SE Exp(b) 
Nonproduction child pornography 
offenders 
2.46 0.23 11.70
***
 
Trial –0.08 0.29  
Detained presentence –1.94 0.13 0.14*** 
Age –0.02 0.00  
Male 0.72 0.56  
College 0.03 0.13  
No high-school diploma –0.02 0.20  
Black 0.46 0.32  
Hispanic –0.02 0.25  
American Indian/Alaskan Native 0.26 0.34  
U.S. citizen 0.61 0.38  
Number of dependents –0.18 0.13  
Presumptive sentence 0.01 0.00 1.01
***
 
Criminal history score –0.41 0.08 0.66*** 
Offense severity score 0.16 0.03 1.17
***
 
Circuit reject policy disagreement –0.72 0.12 0.49*** 
Mandatory minimum case –1.15 0.15 0.32*** 
Constant –3.35 0.68 —*** 
Sigma  2.95  
Log likelihood  –4,842.34  
N  3,126  
Notes. Nonproduction = possession, receipt, distribution, and transportation; SE = standard error. Exponentiated 
betas shown only for variables with statistical significance. 
***
p < .001. 
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Table 3. Descriptive Statistics for Sex Abuse and Child Pornography Offenders Before and After Propensity Score 
Matching
a 
 Full Sample Matched Sample 
Variable 
Sexual 
Abuse 
Nonproduction 
Child 
Pornography P Value 
Sexual 
Assault 
Nonproduction 
Child 
Pornography p Value 
Variables       
Downward judicial departures 16.86 46.35 <.001 19.05 49.45 <.001 
Independent Variables       
Case characteristics       
Trial 12.72 3.36 <.001 12.32 11.44 .723 
Detained presentence 82.40 57.41 <.001 80.06 86.80 .018 
Offender characteristics       
Mean age 37.07 42.24 <.001 38.88 39.25 .710 
Percent male 95.33 99.17 <.001 82.40 82.40 1.000 
Percent college 35.85 55.09 <.001 45.75 43.98 .645 
Percent no high-school diploma 26.63 10.04 <.001 14.66 17.01 .402 
Percent Black 12.18 3.01 <.001 10.85 10.26 .804 
Percent American Indian/Alaskan 
Native 40.31 0.54 <.001 3.52 4.69 .441 
Percent Hispanic 9.39 6.31 <.002 12.90 12.90 1.000 
Percent U.S. citizen 94.56 97.38 <.001 93.55 92.38 .550 
Percent with dependents 49.87 30.89 <.001 43.40 43.70 .939 
Guideline factors       
Presumptive sentence 124.72 118.20 .015 119.41 128.80 .160 
Mean criminal history score 1.80 1.34 <.001 1.59 1.60 .899 
Mean offense severity score 27.98 30.21 <.001 29.05 28.59 .329 
Number of counts 1.41 1.39 .841 1.48 1.56 .583 
Mean circuits reject policy 
disagreement 48.61 54.27 .998 56.89 56.01 .817 
Mean mandatory minimum case 35.10 51.09 1.000 53.96 49.56 .251 
n 3,320 672 
Notes. Nonproduction child pornography = possession, receipt, distribution, or transportation of child pornography. Cases 
involving the production of child pornography were excluded. 
a 
One-to-one matching without replacement. 
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Table 4. Tobit Regression Models of (ln) of Judicial Downward Departures for Child 
Pornography Offenders and Matched Group of Offenders 
 Child Pornography
a
 vs. Matched Sexual Abuse 
 1-to-1  With Replacement 
Variable b SE Exp(b)  b SE Exp(b) 
Child pornography offenders 2.96 .42 19.27
***
  3.58 .28 35.79
***
 
Constant –3.41 .41 —***  –2.66 .28 —*** 
Sigma  4.14    3.25  
Log likelihood  –814.47    –4815.15  
n  672    2,869  
 Child Pornography
a
 vs. All Other Matched Cases 
 1-to-1  With Replacement 
Variable b SE Exp(b)  b SE Exp(b) 
Child pornography offenders 1.35 .13 3.85
***
  1.61 .13 4.99
***
 
Constant –.54 .11 —***  –.71 .12 —*** 
Sigma  3.29    3.30  
Log likelihood  –4975.72    –6263.12  
n  3,136    3,807  
a 
Production of child pornography cases were excluded from the analyses. 
 
***
p < .001. 
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Table 5. Tobit Decomposition for the Probability and Length of Judicial Departures in Matched 
Samples of Child Pornography and Sexual Abuse Offenders 
 Downward Departure—Full Population 
 ∆ Prob ∆ Length 
Child pornography offenders 31.97% 82.73% 
95% Confidence interval [25.88% to 38.06%] [64.92% to 100%] 
 Downward Departure—Matched Sample 
 ∆ Prob ∆ Length 
Child pornography offenders 25.15% 82.70% 
95% Confidence interval [17.98% to 32.32%] [58.99% to 100%] 
Notes. Significant effects (p < .05) reported in bold. Full population downward departure n = 3,320; matched sample 
downward departure n = 686. 
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Table 6. Number of Judicial Written Reasons for Downward Departures By Offense Type  
(Per 1,000) 
Offense Type Count Population Rate 
Child pornography 86  3,359 25.60 
Sexual abuse 11 792 13.89 
Violent 33 3,846 8.58 
Firearm 60 15,844 3.77 
Drug 173 50,856 3.40 
Fraud/white collar 150 24,043 6.24 
Property 14  3,543 3.95 
Other 57  9,261 6.15 
Note. Immigration cases were excluded from the analyses. 
